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INTRODUCTION
The United States and other governments increasingly have
turned to hiring private military and private security companies
(jointly “PMSCs”) in situations of armed conflict.1 In light of the
sudden prominence of PMSCs, as well as notorious instances of
misconduct,2 there has been recent critical attention devoted to
the role of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) in regulating
them. As neither clearly combatants nor civilians, the
application of IHL to PMSCs remains unclear. The emerging
consensus among academics and the international community is
that given the realities of the PMSC industry, the vast majority of
PMSC personnel will have the status of civilian, which protects
them unless and until they directly participate in hostilities.3
Presumptively treating the vast majority of PMSC personnel
as civilians, although consistent with a general IHL presumption
in favor of civilian status,4 is overinclusive and leads to legal and
practical difficulties: it fails to recognize the truly military-like
operations of some PMSCs (indeed, some are contracted to
perform direct military operations); the indeterminacy of the
nature and temporal scope of direct participation may prove
unworkable in practice; and personnel taking an active part in

1. See Mohamad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, The Nature and Characteristics of
Contemporary Armed Conflict, reprinted in PROTECTING HUMAN DIGNITY IN ARMED
CONFLICT: SPEECHES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON OCCASION OF THE
140TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NETHERLANDS RED CROSS 20, 21 (Sanne Boswijk ed., 2008)
(describing “the privatisation and autonomisation of the use of force” as a prominent
phenomenon in a new paradigm of conflict); see also P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 9 (2003) (“A new global
industry has emerged. It is outsourcing and privatization of a twenty-first-century
variety, and it changes many of the old rules of international politics and warfare.”).
2. See, e.g., David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis
Without Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1 (stating that an inquiry found private
security company (“PSC”) Blackwater’s shootings in Nisour Square, Iraq, had resulted
in at least fourteen unjustified civilian deaths).
3. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & DIRECTORATE OF INT’L LAW
(SWITZ.), THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT: ON PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS AND GOOD PRACTICES FOR STATES RELATED TO OPERATIONS OF PRIVATE
MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES DURING ARMED CONFLICT (2009) [hereinafter
MONTREUX DOCUMENT].
4. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (“In case of doubt whether a
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”).
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the hostilities are chargeable with unprivileged belligerency for
duties they may have been hired to perform.
This Article contends that it is possible and preferable to
identify a subclassification within PMSCs by treating differently
PMSCs hired to engage in activities that constitute direct
participation in hostilities. If PMSCs are contracted to perform
specified activities constituting direct participation, defined
below as “contractor combatant activities,” they should be
considered combatants. Through a suggested treaty provision,
States contracting PMSCs to engage in contractor combatant
activities would be required to contractually mandate PMSC
compliance with Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva
Convention. This approach carves out from civilian status a
category of PMSC personnel that engage in combatant-type
activities.
Part I of this Article provides relevant background on IHL
and PMSCs. Part II highlights the theoretical and practical
problems with categorically presuming the majority of PMSC
personnel to have civilian status. Part III details the mechanics
and benefits of this new approach. Such an approach to
regulating PMSCs would be both more functional in practice
and more harmonious with the doctrine and purposes of
international humanitarian law.
I. PMSCS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
FRAMEWORK
The recent and meteoric rise in the presence of PMSCs in
the theater of armed conflict occurred after the treaties
governing the law of war were drafted and largely ratified. This
Part sets out the strain PMSCs have placed on international
humanitarian law by outlining the nature of PMSCs, identifying
how international humanitarian law governs their status, and
detailing attempts to place PMSCs within the framework of IHL.
A. The Rise and Role of PMSCs
Private military and security companies have become an
increasing presence and played an increasing role in situations
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of armed conflict.5 A preliminary note on terminology:
Brookings Institute analyst Peter Singer influentially has divided
PMSCs into three categories—military support firms, military
consulting firms, and military provider firms.6 Other
delineations of PMSCs draw distinctions along lethal versus
nonlethal capabilities and “active” versus “passive” services.7 As
international humanitarian law is less concerned with formal
labels and more directed at functional behavior, this Article
eschews subclassifying PMSCs in favor of a general definition of
private contractors engaged in security or military operations,
broadly construed.8
While governments have employed private actors in warfare
for centuries, the growth and corporatization of private military
actors is a post-Cold War phenomenon that emerged in the
wake of globalization.9 There has been a dramatic increase in
the prevalence of PMSCs10 and now as many as 200 PMSCs
operate worldwide.11 Governments increasingly have used
5. For a thorough examination of many facets of private military and private
security companies (“PMSCs”), see generally SINGER, supra note 1.
6. See id. at 91.
7. See Doug Brooks, Protecting People: The PMC Potential-Comments and Suggestions
for the UK Green Paper on Regulating Private Military Services 3 (Int’l Peace Operations
Ass’n, Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.hoosier84.com/0725brookspmc
regs.pdf.
8. Such an approach is consistent with the International Committee of the Red
Cross’s (“ICRC”) position. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 9 (“‘PMSCs’ are
private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of
how they describe themselves.”); id. at 38 cmt. (“[F]rom the humanitarian point of
view, the relevant question is not how a company is labeled but what specific services it
provides in a particular instance.”); see also Alexandre Faite, Involvement of Private
Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications Under International Humanitarian Law, 4 DEF.
STUD. 166, 168–69 (2004) (discussing the recent rise of private military companies
(“PMCs”) in modern war zones). Additionally, the United Nations Working Group on
the Use of Mercenaries has offered a similar definition: “[PMSC] refers to a corporate
entity which provides on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by
physical persons and/or legal entities.” Rep. of the Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the
Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination, 15th Sess., art. 2(a), at 24, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/15/25, Annex, Draft of a Possible Convention on Private Military and Security
Companies (PMSCs) for Consideration and Action by the Human Rights Council (July
2, 2010) [hereinafter Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention].
9. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 39–40.
10. See id. at 40 (“[T]he private military market has expanded in a way not seen
since the 1700s.”).
11. See Adam Ebrahim, Note, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford: The United
States, International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 181, 184
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PMSCs in situations of armed conflict.12 For example, in the first
Gulf War there was an estimated 1 contractor per 50 to 100
soldiers.13 In 2003, contractors accounted for up to thirty
percent of military support services in Iraq and PMSCs
constituted the third-largest contributor to the war effort after
the United States and Britain.14 A leaked 2009 congressional
report indicated that contractors constituted forty-eight percent
of US personnel in Iraq and fifty-seven percent in Afghanistan.15
At the start of 2011, the US Department of Defense was
employing over 87,000 contractors in Afghanistan and over
70,000 in Iraq.16 In Afghanistan, those numbers represent a ratio
of 84 contractors for every 100 soldiers.17 In Iraq, the ratio is
even higher: 129 contractors for every 100 soldiers.18
Private military and security companies perform a wide
variety of work, from armed guarding and protection of persons
and objects, to maintenance and operation of weapons systems,
to prisoner detention, to advice to or training of local forces and
security personnel.19 Some PMSCs are even contracted to
(2010) (“Roughly 200 [PMCs] operate worldwide.”). But see Anthony Bianco &
Stephanie Anderson Forest, Outsourcing War: An Inside Look at Brown & Root, the
Kingpin of America’s New Military-Industrial Complex, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 68
(placing the number of PMCs at ninety in 2002).
12. See Mercenaries: The Baghdad Boom, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2004, at 55
(describing the “boom” in business for PMCs and citing as an example Global Risk
Strategies, which, during the invasion of Afghanistan, expanded from a two-man team
to a company with over 1000 guards); see also Joshua Lipton, DynCorp Dynamite on New
High, FORBES.COM (June 7, 2007, 10:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/07/
dyncorp-defense-military-markets-equity-cx_jl_0607markets12.html.
13. See Nelson D. Schwartz, The Pentagon’s Private Army, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2003,
at 100.
14. See Bianco & Forest, supra note 11; Mercenaries: The Baghdad Boom, supra note
12.
15. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5
(2009).
16. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF, CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE
USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN (2011), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/docs/5A_paper/5A_Jan2011_final.doc [hereinafter
USCENTCOM CONTRACTORS].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 9; see also Private Military and
Security Companies: The Costs of Outsourcing War, AMNESTY INT’L USA,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-human-rights/privatemilitary-and-security-companies (last visited Jan. 12, 2012); Q&A: Private Security in Iraq,
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engage directly in combat.20 Others, although contracted to
provide defensive services, may find themselves in intense
firefights.21 According to the security consultancy Hart Group:
“All good companies employ only ex-soldiers or policemen.”22
Standard equipment includes pistols, rifles, body armor, and
armored vehicles.23 The PMSCs in Iraq perform the armed
services of guarding various fixed sites, providing convoy
security, acting as security escorts of individuals traveling in
unsecured areas in Iraq, and supplying personal security for
high-ranking individuals.24 They also perform the unarmed
security services of operational coordination (establishing and
managing command, control, and communications operations
centers), intelligence analysis (gathering information and
developing threat analysis), and security training to Iraqi
security forces.25 In Afghanistan, over 18,000 private security
contractors hired by the US Department of Defense perform
“personal security, convoy security, and static security missions,”
although, as the Department of Defense somewhat obliquely
indicates, “[n]ot all private security contractor personnel are
armed.”26
In short, there has been an explosive rise in the prevalence
and number of contractor personnel utilized in areas of
ongoing conflict. These PMSCs perform a diffuse array of duties,
ranging from maintenance to armed convoy security. Even
BBC NEWS (May 27, 2004, 9:52 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
3747421.stm [hereinafter BBC Q&A].
20. See Keith Somerville, Dogs of War into Doves of Peace, BBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2002,
3:56 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2403517.stm (describing perhaps the
most infamous combat contractor, Executive Outcomes, a now-defunct South African
company that was involved in Angola and Sierra Leone); see also SINGER, supra note 1,
at 101–18 (devoting a chapter of analysis to Executive Outcomes).
21. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in
Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 514 (2005)
(detailing an incident in which Blackwater USA was attacked by insurgents: in the
ensuing firefight, it expended thousands of rounds of ammunition and hundreds of
forty millimeter grenades, and resupplied its employees with its own helicopters).
22. BBC Q&A, supra note 19.
23. Id.
24. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 3
(2008).
25. Id.
26. USCENTCOM CONTRACTORS, supra note 16.
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before examining the contours of international humanitarian
law, one can begin to imagine the difficulty in coherently
classifying or regulating such a diverse set of actors.
B. International Humanitarian Law
At the heart of international humanitarian law lies the
fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians.27
This principle performs two equally important functions in
situations of armed conflict. First, it aims to protect civilians to
the maximum extent possible from the effects of armed
conflict.28 Second, only combatants have the right to participate
directly in hostilities.29 This Section outlines the provisions of
IHL that govern a person’s status, under both international
armed conflict and internal armed conflict.30
Treaties applicable to situations of international armed
conflict create the binary distinction of members of armed
forces and civilians. Under the Third Geneva Convention,
combatants include official, militia, and volunteer members of
the armed forces (Article 4(A)(1)); members of other militias
and volunteer corps that meet specified conditions (Article
4(A)(2)); members of an armed force of a government not
recognized by the Detaining Power (Article 4(A)(3)); and
27. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian
Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict,
87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 198 (2005) (listing as the very first rule of customary
international humanitarian law (“IHL”): “The parties to the conflict must at all times
distinguish between civilians and combatants”).
28. See, e.g., Faite, supra note 8, at 171 (“It is a cornerstone of international
humanitarian law that, while civilians must be protected to the largest possible extent
from the effects of armed conflict and may not be attacked, enemy combatants
represent military targets and may be attacked lawfully as long as they are not hors de
combat.”).
29. See, e.g., Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate Levels of
Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209, 218–31 (2005) (describing
combatant status under international humanitarian law).
30. As do many academic commentaries, for the sake of simplicity, this Article
classifies IHL provisions on armed conflict into “international” and “internal” (or
“noninternational”). See, e.g., Faite, supra note 8, at 171–72. Nonetheless, it bears
noting that there are gradations within both international and internal armed conflict.
See, e.g., RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 247–
69 (2002) (describing five distinct categories of armed conflict: two international
(Geneva Conventions, Protocol I), two internal (Protocol II, Common Article 3), and
internal disturbances not cognizable as armed conflict under IHL).
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participants in a levée en masse, or citizens who respond
spontaneously to invasion (Article 4(A)(6)).31 Article 4(A)(2),
based on the Hague Regulations of 1907,32 requires that other
militias must “belong” to a party to the conflict, and includes
organized resistance movements.33 To qualify as combatants
under Article 4(A)(2), however, the militia or volunteer corps
must comply with four requirements: they must (a) have a
command structure; (b) have a “fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance;” (c) carry arms openly; and (d)
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war.34
Article 4(A)(2) generated significant controversy in drafting, as
States differed on whether to recognize unconventional fighters
or resistance groups as combatants.35 They reached a
compromise by including the four formal requirements.36 The
levée en masse constitutes the only armed actors without any
institutional organization to still be considered combatants.37
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions maintains a similar
approach and clarifies that a civilian is any person who does not
belong to one of the above specified categories of combatants.38
Moreover, in case of doubt, a person shall be considered a
civilian.39 Protocol I also carves out mercenaries from having
combatant privileges.40 The treaty defines mercenary narrowly,
however, with six formal elements that must be met: (a) being
specially recruited in order to fight; (b) taking a direct part in
the hostilities; (c) being motivated essentially by the desire for
31. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
32. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
33. Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2).
34. Id.
35. See Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L.
391, 417–20 (2010).
36. Id. at 418.
37. See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A
Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831, 839 (2010).
38. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50(1); see FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD,
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 87 (3d ed. 2001) (describing
the Protocol I distinction between combatants and civilians).
39. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50(1).
40. Id. art. 47(1).
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private gain; (d) being neither a national of a party to the
conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the
conflict; (e) not being a member of the armed forces of a party
to the conflict; and (f) not being sent by a State that is not a
party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed
forces.41
In internal armed conflict, neither Common Article 3 nor
Protocol II defines combatant or civilian.42 Nonetheless, both
assume categorical distinctions by using the terminology of
“armed forces.”43 According to the International Committee of
the Red Cross (“ICRC”), the “wording and logic” of both reveal
that “civilians, armed forces, and organized armed groups of the
parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive categories also in
noninternational armed conflict.”44 This proposition is not
entirely settled,45 but none doubt that IHL aims to protect
civilians in both international and internal armed conflict.46
41. Id. art. 47(2); see Faite, supra note 8, at 169 (stating that the rigid definition of
mercenary has been judged unworkable by many).
42. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II].
43. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 3(1) (“Persons taking no active
part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat . . . .”); Protocol II, supra note 42, art. 1(1)
(describing the conflict between “armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups”).
44. Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 991, 1003 (2008); see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the
Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523, 1527 (2007) (“Common Article 3
necessarily presumes the existence of combatants, because by protecting civilians, the
article explicitly affirms the existence of hostilities, which inevitably draws attention to
the legal status of those persons engaged in violence.”).
45. Compare Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: 2008 Year-in-Review, 7 NW.
U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 170, 189 n.89 (2009) (describing a case before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia accepting as analogous rules governing
status in international and internal armed conflicts), with Richard Murphy & Afsheen
John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 421
(2009) (highlighting the position of some that the status of “combatant” has no
relevance in internal armed conflict).
46. See, e.g., Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 150 (2009) (stating that as “an uncontroversial
principle of customary international law, parties to an armed conflict must distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants,” which extends to situations of
internal armed conflict).
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Accordingly, in any armed conflict of sufficient magnitude to
trigger application of the regime of IHL, the principle of
civilian/combatant distinction applies.
A broader terminology based upon the international
humanitarian law treaties describes various types of combatants
in both international and internal armed conflict as “organized
armed groups.” In international armed conflict, they are either
the irregular armed forces belonging to a State (such as militia
and volunteer corps), or organized resistance movements.47 In
internal conflict, they are the armed forces of a non-State
party.48 As Nils Melzer, legal adviser to the ICRC, explains:
“Organized armed groups constitute armed forces in a strictly
functional sense, in that they are de facto charged with the
conduct of hostilities on behalf of a party to the conflict.”49
Determining membership in an organized armed group is a
functional, not formal, inquiry that turns on whether the
group’s continuous function is to directly participate in
hostilities.50 This terminology is helpful, as it bridges both
international and internal armed conflict to identify non-State
combatant actors.
Regardless of the nature of conflict, another foundation of
international humanitarian law is that civilians are to be
protected unless and until they directly participate in
hostilities.51 The Commentary to Protocol I defined “direct
participation” as “acts of war which by their nature or purpose
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment
of the enemy armed forces.”52 Nonetheless, the concept of
“direct participation” has been difficult to delineate.53 This
difficulty is intuitively unsurprising, as the permutations of
activities that could be interpreted to support hostilities are
47. See Melzer, supra note 37, at 838; see also Geneva Convention III, supra note 31,
art. 4(A)(1)–(2).
48. See Melzer, supra note 37, at 838.
49. Id. at 839.
50. See id.
51. See Henckaerts, supra note 27, at 198 (listing this proposition as one of the
customary rules of IHL).
52. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 619
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
53. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 6 (labeling the issue as “one of the most difficult,
but as yet unresolved issues of international humanitarian law”).
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nearly limitless. One can imagine a spectrum ranging from the
soldier on the ground to the taxpayer whose money funds the
military. At what point in between does one draw the line for
activities that constitute “direct participation” and those
activities that do not? Compounding the difficulty is status
fluidity: a civilian who directly participates in hostilities loses
civilian status, but only “for such time as” she participates
directly.54 Once the civilian ceases to participate directly, she
regains her civilian status.55 Although simple in theory, the
temporal requirement can lead to fears of a “revolving door” in
which a daytime civilian fights during the night, only to return
to protected civilian status the next day, and so on and so
forth.56
Following a large-scale endeavor to better clarify the
concept, the ICRC released guidance on “direct participation in
hostilities.”57 Notwithstanding the ninety-odd pages of analysis,
essentially a civilian directly participates through a specific act
that meets a certain threshold of harm, has a direct causal link
to the harm, and is designed to support one party in the conflict
to the detriment of another.58 The ICRC also focused the
temporal component: “Civilians lose protection against direct
attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct
participation in hostilities.”59 Notwithstanding the extended
effort to bring clarity to “direct participation,” commentators
already have launched a heated debate as to the approach,
viability, and feasibility of the document.60 The central fault line
concerns whether the ICRC’s publication too heavily favors
civilian protection at the expense of military efficiency and
54. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(3); see Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”:
The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741,
742 (2010).
55. See Boothby, supra note 54, at 759.
56. See Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641,
686 (2010); see also Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
115, 157 (2010) (examining complications of temporal civilian status).
57. Melzer, supra note 44, at 991.
58. Id. at 995–96.
59. Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
60. See generally Forum, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Perspectives on the ICRC
Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637 (2010) (containing four articles
critiquing and one defending the ICRC’s approach).
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necessity.61 This Article leaves to better hands the task of striking
the proper balance between military necessity and civilian
protection, but simply notes that satisfactorily defining “direct
participation in hostilities” has proven to be an elusive target.
Overall, the principle of distinction between combatants
and civilians is virtually the sine qua non of international
humanitarian law and applies whenever IHL itself applies.
Civilians are protected unless and until they directly participate
in hostilities, although the precise contours of “direct
participation” remain hazy.
C. Recent Attempts at Classification
The international community has struggled to determine
the placement of PMSCs within the framework of IHL. PMSCs
strain the binary principle of distinction due to the variable
nature of their duties. One private contractor may seem
distinctly civilian by providing “ash and trash” duties like
maintaining planes or hauling garbage, while another may
appear indisputably a combatant by carrying a gun and serving
alongside active-duty Special Forces soldiers.62 How then does
one fit a seemingly fluid group into a presumptive status? There
have been two recent, large-scale efforts to address this question:
one by the ICRC, and the other by the United Nations (“UN”)
Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of
peoples to self-determination (“Mercenary Working Group”).
The ICRC, in conjunction with seventeen governments,
produced the Montreux Document, which seeks to provide
interpretive guidance on the legal obligations of States related
to PMSCs in the absence of a clearly applicable treaty or
provision.63 According to the document, regardless of their
status under IHL (combatant or civilian), the personnel of
PMSCs must comply with international humanitarian law.64 As
61. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 6 (2010).
62. See Schwartz, supra note 13 (describing different duties of US contractors in
the Middle East).
63. See Paul Seger & Philip Spoerri, Foreword to MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra
note 3, at 5.
64. Id. at 14.
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far as their status, they are protected as civilians unless they fit
one of three exceptions: (1) they are incorporated into the
regular armed forces of a State; (2) they are members of
organized armed forces, groups, or units under a command
responsible to the State; or (3) they otherwise lose their
protections as determined by international humanitarian law.65
The commentary accompanying the Montreux principles
clarifies that the “members of organized armed forces” prong
refers to the requirements of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third
Geneva Convention.66 In other words, PMSC personnel are not
considered civilians if they are under responsible command,
have a distinctive fixed sign, carry arms openly, and obey the
laws of war.67 According to the commentary, the third
exception—otherwise lose their protection—refers to the
concept of a “rebel soldier” in noninternational armed
conflict.68 The commentary also elaborates that the status of
PMSC personnel requires a case-by-case analysis and depends on
the relevant contract and services, but that the “large majority of
PMSC personnel” will likely be civilians.69
To summarize the position of the Montreux Document,
PMSC personnel are presumed to be civilians. Only if they are
formally incorporated into armed forces, rigidly adhere to
Article 4(A)(2), or act as rebel soldiers in a noninternational
armed conflict, will they be considered combatants.
The Mercenary Working Group has drawn an even stricter
line in favor of civilian status. The mandate extension of the
Mercenary Working Group charged it with preparing a draft of
international basic principles regulating private military and
security companies.70 The Mercenary Working Group recently
fulfilled this mandate by preparing a draft Convention on
Private Military and Security Companies (“PMSC Draft
65. Id.
66. Id. at 36 cmt.; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
67. See Montreux Document, supra note 3, at 36 cmt.; see also Geneva Convention
III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2).
68. MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 37 cmt.
69. Id. at 36 cmt.
70. See Human Rights Council Res. 7/21, Mandate of the Working Group on the
Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise
of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶ 2(e), 7th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/7/21 (Mar. 28, 2008).
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Convention”).71 The UN Human Rights Council considered the
PMSC Draft Convention and voted thirty-two to twelve to
establish a working group to consider elaborating a legally
binding instrument to regulate PMSCs, based on the PMSC
Draft Convention.72
In the PMSC Draft Convention, the Mercenary Working
Group has taken a broad “international law” approach and
combines both human rights and humanitarian law in its
proposed regulation of PMSCs.73 The PMSC Draft Convention
focuses on regulation of PMSCs by State parties, requiring States
to ensure that PMSCs respect international human rights and
international humanitarian law.74 Although the PMSC Draft
Convention does not address the mechanics of how IHL should
govern PMSC status, it does prohibit the use of force by PMSCs
to, inter alia, overthrow a government, change borders of a
State, target civilians, cause disproportionate harm, or provide
training to accomplish any of the above.75 It also prohibits PMSC
personnel from engaging in
inherently State functions, including direct participation in
hostilities, waging war and/or combat operations, taking
prisoners, law-making, espionage, intelligence, knowledge
transfer with military, security and policing application, use
of and other activities related to weapons of mass
destruction, police powers, especially the powers of arrest or
detention including the interrogation of detainees, and
other functions that a State Party considers to be inherently
State functions.76

This restriction is very broad on permissible PMSC
activities, as it essentially prohibits PMSC personnel from
71. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8.
72. See Human Rights Council Res. 15/26, Open-Ended Intergovernmental
Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory
Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private
Military and Security Companies, ¶ 4, at 2, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/26
(Oct. 7, 2010).
73. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8,
Annex ¶ PP 2, at 21 (recognizing the “principles and rules of international human
rights and humanitarian law and their complementarity”).
74. Id. Annex art. 4(2), at 26; id. Annex art. 5(1), at 27; id. Annex arts. 7(1)–(2),
at 28.
75. Id. Annex art. 8, at 28–29.
76. Id. Annex art. 9, at 29.
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engaging in any combatant activities.77 Moreover, by prohibiting
direct participation in hostilities, the Draft Convention implicitly
endorses the notion that PMSC personnel are civilians, not
combatants.
Commentators also have weighed in as to the status of
PMSC personnel under IHL. Applying the framework of
international humanitarian law, they have uniformly concluded
that the majority of PMSC personnel will fall under the category
of civilian.78 Based on the realities of the industry, the vast
majority of contractors will be considered civilians because they
are almost never formally incorporated79 and will seldom meet
all requirements of Article 4(A)(2).80
There have been suggestions that PMSCs should be
considered mercenaries under IHL.81 Given the rigid six-part
definition of mercenaries set forth in Protocol I, however, most
commentators conclude that in nearly all circumstances, PMSC
personnel will not constitute mercenaries.82 The clearest
77. One commentator notes that at least one member of the Mercenary Working
Group criticized the Montreux Document for recognizing de facto and legitimizing the
PMSC industry, which may explain in part the much stricter regulation in the proposed
PMSC Convention. See Nigel D. White, The Privatisation of Military and Security Functions
and Human Rights: Comments on the UN Working Group’s Draft Convention, 11 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 133, 135 (2011).
78. See, e.g., Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies: Their Status Under
International Humanitarian Law and Its Impact on Their Regulation, 88 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 573, 587 (2006); Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private
Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
525, 539 (2006).
79. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 78, at 583 (stating that “the whole point of
privatization is precisely the opposite” of formal incorporation); Schmitt, supra note 21,
at 525 (concluding that PMSCs will almost never be formally incorporated into armed
forces and that formal incorporation requires more than a contract); see also Gillard,
supra note 78, at 533 (“[T]here are likely to be very few instances in which the staff of
PMCs/PSCs are incorporated into the armed forces . . . .”).
80. See Daniel P. Ridlon, Contractors or Illegal Combatants? The Status of Armed
Contractors in Iraq, 62 A.F. L. REV. 199, 248–49 (2008); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 527–31;
see also Cameron, supra note 78, at 583–85; Gillard, supra note 78, at 534–36.
81. See, e.g., Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global
Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 17–26 (1999).
82. See, e.g., MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 40 cmt.; see also, e.g., Ebrahim,
supra note 11, at 210–12; Faite, supra note 8, at 169–70; E. L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0?
The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and Its Implications for International
Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 232–33 (2008); Kevin H.
Govern & Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: International Law Misses Its
Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 55, 83 (2008); Ridlon, supra note 80, at 232.
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stumbling block is Protocol I Article 47(2)(a)’s requirement of
being “specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in
an armed conflict,” because PMSCs rarely are contracted
specifically to fight.83 Interestingly, although the Mercenary
Working Group was tasked with drafting a treaty to regulate
PMSCs, it similarly has concluded that most PMSCs do not fit
the mercenary definition.84
In sum, PMSCs now form an integral part of the landscape
of armed conflict. Given the varied nature of their operations,
their collocation within the regime of IHL can be described as
uncomfortable at best. There is a general consensus that under
the framework of international humanitarian law, the great
majority of PMSC personnel will have civilian status. The ICRC
has placed them presumptively on the civilian side of the
combatant-civilian dichotomy. The Mercenary Working Group
effectively would confine PMSC personnel to civilian status by
favoring the outright prohibition of any direct participation in
hostilities. The next Part examines whether treating PMSC
personnel as presumptively (or categorically) civilian is the
optimal approach within the framework of international
humanitarian law.
II. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL DEFICIENCIES
Presuming PMSC personnel to be civilians honors a general
IHL principle of resolving doubt over status in favor of civilian.85
Nonetheless, as this Part demonstrates, there are substantial
drawbacks with this global presumption in the context of
PMSCs. First, if determining direct participation is inherently
difficult, the problem is only exacerbated in the situation of
PMSCs, leading to legal and practical inadequacies. Second,
civilian status for certain PMSCs may have the perverse effect of
leaving them unable to lawfully engage in response to
predictable combat, effectively rendering unlawful any
participation in hostilities.

83. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 47(2)(a).
84. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8,
¶ 38 (“PMSC personnel cannot usually be considered to be mercenaries . . . .”).
85. See Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50.
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A. Difficulties in Determining Direct Participation
With civilian status, PMSC personnel are protected from
attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities.86 Determining direct participation for any civilian is
difficult; the ICRC crafted ten recommendations to determine
direct participation, but the ninety pages of guidance attest to
the residual ambiguity in applying the recommendations.87 The
inherent difficulties in determining civilian participation
become heightened in the context of PMSC personnel, given
the variable nature of their duties. The Montreux commentary
provides examples of direct participation by contractors:
guarding military bases against attacks from the enemy party,
gathering tactical military intelligence, and operating weapons
systems in a combat operation.88 In contrast, direct participation
does not include equipment maintenance, logistic services,
guarding diplomatic missions or other civilian sites, or
catering.89 Nor does it include collection of intelligence of a
nontactical nature or purchasing, smuggling, manufacturing, or
maintaining weapons and equipment outside specific military
operations.90
Yet, despite these neatly drawn categories, the distinctions
can break down quickly. The ICRC recognizes as much and
provides as an example the thin line “between the defence of
military personnel and other military objectives against enemy
attacks (direct participation in hostilities) and the protection of
those same persons and objects against crime or violence
unrelated to the hostilities (law enforcement/defence of self or
others).”91 This difference can become even fuzzier in the
context of resisting attack by an outlawed resistance group, since
such groups teeter between combatant and civilian status;
86. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 995; see also Govern & Bales, supra note 81, at 72
(“The legal fate of individual contractors turns entirely on what is meant by ‘direct
participation’ in hostilities.”).
87. Melzer, supra note 44, at 995–96.
88. MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 37 cmt.
89. Id. at 39 cmt.
90. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1008. But see Faite, supra note 8, at 173 (“[I]t is
arguable that private contractors involved in transportation of weapons and other
military commodities, intelligence, strategic planning or procurement of arms, may
lose the protection afforded to civilians . . . .”).
91. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1010.
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consequently, engaging with the group could constitute direct
participation in hostilities or it could constitute a police
operation apart from hostilities.92 One can also imagine a thin
line regarding collecting intelligence: What constitutes
“nontactical” intelligence? What if the intelligence later
becomes tactically useful?93 Similarly, the distinction between
military and civilian sites may be blurred where the site is not
part of military infrastructure but is a legitimate military target.94
Additionally, while the ICRC limits operating weapons to
constitute direct participation only when done in a combat
operation (which seems to imply some form of affirmative
planning and engagement), another commentator considers it
natural that PMSC forces directly participate in hostilities when
they engage in defensive actions seeking to harm enemy
personnel.95 It also bears noting that fighting to attack and
fighting to defend are legally insignificant distinctions in the
IHL regime: both constitute direct participation.96
Moreover, there is a clear temporal problem with
determining direct participation of PMSC personnel. For
example, Alexandre Faite, a legal advisor to the ICRC, highlights
that on-duty contractors guarding military infrastructures may
be directly participating, whereas off-duty contractors are not.97
As civilians are protected from attack when not directly
participating in hostilities, a contractor’s status could switch
from combatant to civilian with the end of her five o’clock shift.
The real problem with these indeterminacies is that they
exist on a constant continuum: they stretch from the general
92. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 589–90.
93. Cf. Faite, supra note 8, at 173 (contending that any intelligence activity for the
military constitutes direct participation).
94. See id. at 175 (highlighting the ambiguity between military and civilian sites);
see also Anthony Dworkin, Security Contractors in Iraq: Armed Guards or Private Soldiers?,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Apr. 20, 2004), http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/newssecurity.html (“The most difficult question posed by the role of contract security forces
in Iraq may well be this: is the official use of security contractors to defend legitimate or
predictable targets in the face of an organized uprising tantamount to having them
engage in hostilities?”).
95. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 37 cmt.; Ridlon, supra note 80, at
234.
96. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 588 (citing Article 49 of Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions); Gillard, supra note 78, at 540.
97. See Faite, supra note 8, at 174–75.
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nature of the activity (e.g., what kind of intelligence gathering?
Guarding what kind of building?) to the specific circumstances
of any given instance (e.g., on-duty or off? Specific combat
operation or not?). If the above examples were hypothetical
variants on the fringe of PMSC behavior, then the gray area
would only be implicated in a small subset of situations. These
ambiguities, however, exist in a great variety of situations.98
Indeed, for this reason, the ICRC states that the question of
direct participation must be considered on a case-by-case basis,
although it does not clarify who should be making the case-bycase determination.99
The Mercenary Working Group’s PMSC Draft Convention
favors a bright line in place of a presumption, prohibiting PMSC
personnel from engaging in direct participation.100 On its face,
this approach appears simple. Unfortunately, it too suffers from
serious defects. First, as a practical matter, the presence of
contractors in the theater of armed conflict is a reality.101 As
discussed, PMSC personnel engage in a wide variety of activities
that constitute direct participation. Prohibiting them outright
from engaging in direct participation would require an
enormous change in the way PMSCs are utilized; they would not
be permitted to guard military personnel or infrastructure,
gather intelligence of any tactical nature, or engage in defensive
actions against an enemy.102 Although this may be a laudable
98. See, e.g., Ebrahim, supra note 11, at 187–88 (“Often, PMCs provide security for
military, political, and corporate individuals and installations in states like Iraq and
Afghanistan. Security and policing often entails counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency,
and other special operations, in which firms possess large scale military capabilities.
Although they are formally positioned as security forces targeting criminal elements,
they occasionally engage in activities that resemble traditional combat, due to the
nature and scope of international security threats.” (footnotes omitted)).
99. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 1013 (stating that due consideration must be
given to the circumstances of each case); see also MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3,
¶ 24, at 14, 36 cmt. (suggesting a determination of PMSC personnel status on a case-bycase basis).
100. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8,
Annex art. 9, at 29.
101. See, e.g., Gillard, supra note 78, at 526 (“[T]he past years have witnessed a
significant growth in the involvement of PMCs/PSCs in security and military functions
in situations of armed conflict.”).
102. Cf. Ridlon, supra note 80, at 234 (discussing activities of private contractor
personnel in Iraq and describing the likelihood that they will engage in confrontation
with enemy forces).
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goal of the PMSC Draft Convention, the prospects of enacting
such a shift in the utilization of PMSCs are daunting and likely
unrealistic.
Second, civilian status under IHL is fluid because civilians
in areas of armed conflict sometimes do directly participate in
hostilities. Categorically prohibiting PMSC personnel from
direct participation could render unlawful any participation,
even if the hostilities were brought to the PMSC personnel,
rather than the other way around. Such defensive encounters
are commonplace.103 Third, the prohibition hits the same
theoretical wall: what is direct participation? PMSCs can avoid
engaging in direct participation only if they know what it is.
Ultimately, both approaches rely on determining what
constitutes direct participation. Yet, if a multiyear and large-scale
effort by the ICRC and leading scholars to define direct
participation has failed to resolve ambiguity (even if
intentionally so), how can parties involved in armed conflict
know when PMSC personnel are directly participating in
hostilities?
International humanitarian law seeks to regulate the
behavior of parties engaged in armed conflict.104 This
uncertainty surrounding the exact meaning of “direct
participation” presents at least two clear problems. First, status
affects legal entitlements: civilians directly participating in
hostilities do not receive the benefits of combatant status.105
High levels of ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding direct
participation therefore make it difficult for PMSCs to comply
with IHL.106 Second, assuming that other parties engaged in an
armed conflict seek to comply with the law of war, how do they
determine whether PMSC personnel are “directly participating”
in hostilities? In other words, how can they know whether they
103. See id. (“The activities which the armed PMFs in Iraq carry out, though
defensive in nature, lead to engagements with elements of the insurgency.”).
104. See KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 38, at 12 (describing the broad
purpose of IHL as aiming “to restrain the parties to an armed conflict . . . and to
provide essential protection to those most directly affected”).
105. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 21, at 519–22 (detailing some potential
consequences for civilians directly participating in hostilities).
106. See Dworkin, supra note 94 (“[I]t remains troubling that the United States is
putting people into conflict situations whose training, rules of engagement and legal
accountability are unclear.”).
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can lawfully target such contractors? Even if the opposing
combatants seek to abide by the law of war, there may be no
principled way for them to determine PMSC personnel’s status
and, in some instances, they could attack PMSC personnel
lawfully, claiming direct participation in hostilities. At bottom,
relying on direct participation to determine the status of PMSC
personnel becomes a rigid exercise of formalism: in a great
variety of situations, it is only through a difficult (and subjective)
post hoc legal determination that parties to a conflict learn the
status of PMSC personnel. Such a result provides no workable
standard for any party involved in armed conflict.
B. Illegal Combatants?
Beyond the indeterminacy of “direct participation,” there is
a major theoretical drawback to broadly classifying PMSC
personnel as civilians: civilians have no right to engage in
hostilities, so any participation would constitute unprivileged
belligerency (or, in the Bush parlance, “unlawful enemy
combatancy”).107 There are two sides to the same coin of
unprivileged belligerency: one involves participation in
hostilities, and the other concerns the consequences of being
captured and chargeable as an unprivileged belligerent.
The true benefit of civilian status is protection from
attack;108 however, PMSCs frequently operate in areas where
attacks by non-State actors unconcerned with the regime of IHL
are predictable.109 According to the ICRC: “[T]heir proximity to
107. See id. (stating that direct participation in hostilities by contractors would be
legally analogous to Al Qaeda actions on an Afghanistan battlefield); Ridlon, supra note
80, at 233 (“If PMF personnel took part in hostilities, they would not only lose their
protection and become viable targets, but they also would become illegal
combatants.”); cf. Faite, supra note 8, at 174 (“[I]t is striking that detainees in
Guantanamo were denied both prisoner of war status and the protection of the Fourth
Geneva Convention on the basis of what could be a daily bread-and-butter for private
contractors in Iraq: direct participation in the hostilities of individuals that are not
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.”).
108. See, e.g., Karma Nabulsi, Evolving Conceptions of Civilians and Belligerents: One
Hundred Years After the Hague Peace Conferences, in CIVILIANS IN WAR 9, 18 (Simon
Chesterman ed., 2001) (describing the post-World War II normative shift towards
protecting civilians).
109. See Dworkin, supra note 94 (“Iraqi militias have routinely targeted supply
convoys, and have also targeted other sites guarded by private security contractors,
notably regional offices of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Although these are
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the armed forces and other military objectives may expose them
more than other civilians to the dangers arising from military
operations, including the risk of incidental death or injury.”110
In light of their proximity to sites of attack, it seems that PMSC
personnel face a Catch-22: they are obligated contractually to
defend against potential attack, but upon returning fire are
directly participating in hostilities unlawfully. This concern is
somewhat mitigated by the doctrine of self-defense, but its scope
and application are highly dependent on circumstance and do
not reach to all situations.111
Beyond the theoretical prohibition of participating in
hostilities lies a very tangible consequence: if captured, unlawful
combatants do not receive prisoner-of-war status.112 Indeed, they
may even be tried for the simple act of participation, regardless
of whether it violated international humanitarian law.113 One
could contend that by agreeing to operate in conflict areas for
substantial amounts of money,114 PMSC personnel have
consented to this risk. Consenting to potentially face hostile fire,
however, should not be conflated with consenting to commit
acts of unprivileged belligerency. It is highly doubtful that
individuals joining PMSCs intend to consent to facing
prosecution under the laws of war simply for guarding a military
objective or returning hostile fire.
Less formally, there is also a striking subcurrent of double
standards. The United States has taken the position in its
military commissions system at Guantánamo Bay that any act
taken by an “unlawful combatant” can violate the law of war.115 A
civilian not military buildings, they have nevertheless been regularly attacked by Iraqi
insurgents as part of a military campaign. They are predictable if not lawful targets.”).
110. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1010.
111. See Ridlon, supra note 80, at 237–48.
112. See id. at 219.
113. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 531, 541. But see Schmitt, supra note 21, at 520–
21 (contending that “the better position is that only the acts underlying direct
participation are punishable”).
114. See Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of
International Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355, 375–76 (2010)
(describing reports of contractors earning several multiples of a military member’s
salary).
115. See Joseph C. Hansen, Note, Murder and the Military Commissions: Prohibiting
the Executive’s Unauthorized Expansion of Jurisdiction, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1882–83
(2009) (detailing how the Manual for Military Commissions criminalizes any action
taken by an “unlawful combatant” as a violation of the law of war).
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civilian contractor directly participating in hostilities, however,
would also be an unlawful combatant.116 Yet—to indulge a little
hyperbole—civilian contractors employed by the United States
who have directly participated in hostilities do not number
among the ranks of the detainees at Guantánamo. As one
commentator diplomatically observed, “voluntarily creating a
pool of ‘good’ but potentially ‘unlawful combatants’ while
simultaneously condemning other (non-private sector) civilian
participants in hostilities verges on hypocrisy.”117 International
humanitarian law provides a framework designed to regulate the
conduct of all involved in armed conflict; it is therefore an
untenable position to condemn (and even criminalize) the
direct participation of certain civilian actors while condoning
(and even contracting) the participation of others.
There is, therefore, a glaring problem. PMSCs now figure
prominently in the landscape of armed conflict. The broad
consensus is that the majority of their personnel have civilian
status. This assessment of their formal status is undoubtedly
correct under international humanitarian law. Yet this status is
plagued by practical problems: many PMSC personnel directly
participate in hostilities (some continuously, others frequently,
and some occasionally), which is unlawful behavior for civilians.
Rather than enjoy the benefits of civilian status, PMSC
personnel who directly participate will suffer the perverse result
of engaging in unlawful behavior. Even if they seek to comply
with the strictures of IHL, they may not be able to, as
determining direct participation is decidedly difficult.118 The
same goes for other parties who may be unable to distinguish
PMSC personnel from soldiers.119
The result is baffling: correctly categorizing the great
majority of PMSC personnel under international humanitarian

116. See Ridlon, supra note 80, at 233.
117. Cameron, supra note 78, at 594.
118. Cf. id. at 589 (“[T]he determination [of] whether a person actually does
directly participate in hostilities does not necessarily depend on whether that person
intended to do so.”).
119. Michael Schmitt recounts a sobering anecdote of a courtyard full of military
and PMSC personnel in Iraq, none of whom can identify to which companies or armies
the others belong because “they all look so alike, there’s no way to tell.” Schmitt, supra
note 21, at 530–31 n.77.
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law as civilian provides all sides involved in an armed conflict
with no workable standards by which to regulate their behavior.
III. CATEGORICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS
Analytically and practically, it therefore makes sense to
consider some PMSC personnel to be combatants rather than
civilians: the chances they directly participate in hostilities are
high and the chances their civilian status will protect them are
low. Reversing the presumption from treating their status as
generally civilian to generally combatant, however, suffers from
basic defects under international humanitarian law. First,
considering PMSCs to be presumptively combatants essentially
disregards the framework of IHL because most PMSC personnel
do not fit the technical requirements for combatant status set
forth in humanitarian treaties.120 Second, it flips the problem of
considering them to be presumptively civilians, as either
approach (presumptively combatant or presumptively civilian) is
overinclusive: many contractors do not engage in combatant
activities, but are instead simply support personnel. Accordingly,
the solution to the underlying problems of treating the majority
of PMSC personnel as having civilian status cannot be to simply
reclassify them as presumptively combatants.
Recognizing the balance that must be struck between the
competing tensions of the binary principle of distinction in IHL
and the multifaceted duties of PMSC personnel, this Part
suggests a principled line that can be drawn within PMSCs to
better regulate their placement under international
humanitarian law. Rather than melding international
humanitarian law to fit private military and security companies,
this Part proposes molding PMSCs to fit IHL. PMSC personnel
contracted to engage specifically in the type of activity that
constitutes direct participation in hostilities should be
categorically presumed to be members of organized armed
forces and should be required to abide by the requirements of
Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. To provide a
workable line of distinction, Part III proposes the terminology of
“contractor combatant activities,” a new subclassification within
PMSCs. States that hire PMSCs to perform “contractor
120. See supra Part I.C.
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combatant activities” should be required by treaty to mandate
contractually that the PMSCs meet the combatant requirements
of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. This Part
first delineates how this approach would work, and then
examines the benefits that would result to all sides in an armed
conflict.
A. “Contractor Combatant Activities”
Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, applicable
in international armed conflict, requires that members of other
militias must “belong” to a party involved in the conflict and
must fulfill the following conditions in order to receive
combatant status: be under responsible command, have a
distinctive fixed sign, carry arms openly, and obey the laws of
war.121 In comparison, in noninternational armed conflict, the
ICRC clarified that determining membership in an organized
armed group is a purely functional inquiry: “[T]he decisive
criterion . . . is whether a person assumes a continuous
function for the group involving his or her direct participation
in hostilities.”122 PMSC personnel assuming support functions
would not qualify, but those whose duties constitute continuous
participation would.123
The inquiry in international armed conflict is strictly
formal, and in noninternational armed conflict it is functional.
Even in noninternational armed conflict, however, the
functional inquiry turns upon a determination of “direct
participation,” which, as examined above, can be extremely
ambiguous in the context of PMSCs. These approaches suffer
from different weaknesses. The formal inquiry, as an analytical
matter, undermines the general functional approach of IHL by
prioritizing strict requirements over the reality of PMSC
duties.124 The functional noninternational armed conflict
inquiry seems unworkable as a practical matter.125
121. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2).
122. Melzer, supra note 44, at 1007.
123. Id. at 1007–08 ; see Melzer, supra note 37, at 890–91 (explaining that a private
contractor hired to defend a military objective assumes a continuous combat function).
124. The formal versus functional interpretation of IHL is a value judgment that
varies depending on the commentator. To remain relevant, IHL must be interpreted
functionally. Cf. Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of
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Instead of either approach, governments employing PMSCs
should combine the better aspects of each. If PMSC personnel
are hired to engage in a specific list of actions that constitute
direct participation in hostilities (detailed below as “contractor
combatant activities”), they should be presumed to be organized
armed forces and should be required to comply with the
requirements of Article 4(A)(2). The legal placement of these
actions into the combatant box and out of the civilian box
resolves the indeterminacies of construing direct participation:
if PMSCs are contracted to engage in any of these actions, they
will be considered combatants in the conflict. This Section first
defines “contractor combatant activities” and then details how
the shift in regulation would be implemented.
1. Defining “Contractor Combatant Activities”
If PMSC personnel are hired to engage in prespecified
activities (“contractor combatant activities”) before entering a
conflict zone (one where the government has authorized the use
of force), they should be regulated as organized armed forces.
The first piece of making this approach workable is to define the
“contractor combatant activities.”
It is useful to begin by examining recent governmental
attempts to constrict the role of PMSCs in armed conflict.
Consider a proposed US Senate bill, the Stop Outsourcing
Security Act, which has withered on the vine twice in the
Subcommittee on Armed Services.126 The bill would require the
“transition away from the use of private contractors for mission
critical or emergency essential functions . . . in all conflict
zones in which Congress has authorized the use of force.”127 The
bill defines those functions as “activities for which continued
performance is considered essential to support combat systems
and operational activities” or whose interruption “would

War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1759–65 (2009) (describing the spectrum of interpretations
of IHL in light of terrorism and the US war on terror).
125. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the difficulties of determining which actions are
considered direct participation, and demonstrating how such a determination
frequently can be reached only after a post hoc legal analysis).
126. See Stop Outsourcing Security Act of 2010, S. 3023, 111th Cong.; Stop
Outsourcing Security Act of 2007, S. 2398, 110th Cong.
127. S. 3023 § 5(a)(1).
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significantly affect . . . a military operation.”128 Such activities
include protective services, security advice and planning,
military and police training, repair and maintenance for
weapons systems, prison administration, interrogation, and
intelligence.129 The definition in the Outsourcing Security bill is
too broad for purposes of IHL, as it goes well beyond direct
participation in hostilities.130 Nonetheless, it provides an
example of separating the work performed by PMSCs into
different categories.
Another source of guidance is the US Department of
Defense’s attempts to determine the work that private
contractors should not perform. The United States uses the
concept of an “inherently governmental function” to indicate
what services the government should not outsource.131 Along
these lines, the Department of Defense recently listed the
following activities as ones that contractors should not perform:
exercising command authority; conducting combat authorized
by the government; pursuing certain types of security
operations; handling, determining, and caring for POWs,
internees, terrorists, and criminals; directing and controlling
intelligence interrogations; and administering certain detention
facilities.132 The impermissible security operations, which are
highly detailed, include, inter alia, providing security in direct
support of combat, operating in environments with a high
likelihood of hostile fire, and moving resources through a
hostile area as part of an offensive operation.133 Additionally,
contractors should not “perform[] duties critical to combat
operations,” such as supply and maintenance of strategic
128. Id. § 3(1)(A).
129. Id. § 3(1)(B).
130. Compare S. 3023 § 3(1)(A) (defining PMSC direct participation to include
essential “support [for] combat systems and operational activities”), with MONTREUX
DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 39 cmt. (noting that PMSCs are considered civilians where
they provide “support functions”).
131. See Notice of Proposed Policy Letter on Work Reserved for Performance by
Federal Government Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 16188-02 (Mar. 31, 2010) (providing
notice of a policy letter by the US Office of Management and Budget with regard to
work that must be reserved for performance by federal government employees and
seeking input on its proposed definition of “inherently governmental function”).
132. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NO. 1100.22: POLICY AND PROCEDURES
FOR DETERMINING WORKFORCE MIX 17–23 (2010).
133. Id. at 19–20.
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weapon systems and other high level technological functions.134
The US Congress has also stated its “sense” that interrogation of
any type of detainee is an inherently governmental function.135
Drawing from the ICRC’s examples, activities performed by
PMSCs that constitute direct participation in hostilities include
security of military infrastructure, gathering any intelligence for
the military, and the use of weapons in combat operations.136
Commentators also have highlighted activities that constitute
direct participation, including protection of personnel and
military assets, staffing of checkpoints, interrogating suspects or
prisoners, gathering tactical intelligence, participating in
operations to rescue military personnel, engaging in tactical
planning of operations, operating weapons systems, and, of
course, participating in combat operations.137
Building from these sources, it is possible to provide a
prespecified list of activities that would constitute contractor
combatant activities:
Participation in combat operations;
Security in direct support of combat operations;
Security of military infrastructure or checkpoints;
Security of military personnel;
Supply and maintenance of strategic weapon systems;
Interrogation of detainees or prisoners;
Military intelligence gathering; and
Tactical planning of operations.
This list may not be comprehensive and could be modified
to cover additional duties that would constitute direct
participation in hostilities. Again, this list of activities relates to
the actions for which PMSCs are contracted. PMSCs hired to
perform civilian tasks (those which do not fall under the rubric
of contractor combatant activities) may still find themselves
134. Id. at 26.
135. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,
Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 1057(1), 122 Stat. 4356, 4611 (2008).
136. See Melzer, supra note 44, at 1017 n.96, 1032; MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra
note 3, at 37 cmt.; see also supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Faite, supra note 8, at 173–74; Gillard, supra note 78, at 526; Schmitt,
supra note 21, at 536–45.
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directly participating in hostilities, but should not be considered
to have been hired to perform contractor combatant activities.
It bears noting that some of the above activities, such as
participation in combat operations, should be considered
inherently governmental functions, and it may be the case that a
government cannot legitimately delegate such responsibility to a
private actor.138 For example, as Professor Nigel White observes,
the Mercenary Working Group approaches regulating PMSCs
with the view that “inherently governmental or state functions
. . . should not be delegated or outsourced. This is . . . a view
that might not be shared by all governments, especially those
with the most aggressive approaches to privatisation.”139 The
reality, however, is that PMSCs are engaging in these activities.140
Additionally, as examined in the following Section, because this
proposal suggests treating PMSCs hired to perform contractor
combatant activities as Article 4(A)(2) parties to the conflict,
they would “belong” to the contracting State. Accordingly, if a
government contracts a PMSC to engage in an inherently
governmental function, under the strictures of IHL the PMSC
would form part of the government’s forces.141 There remain
serious legal and normative questions over whether
governments legitimately can hire PMSCs to engage in
inherently governmental functions, but in light of the fact that
they currently do, this proposal at least would provide an
accountability “hook” between a PMSC and a contracting State.
It may also, to some extent, mitigate concerns regarding the
overprivatization of the use of force by directly linking private
companies to contracting States. It merits emphasizing,
therefore, that the above list of contractor combatant activities
138. See, e.g., MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 12 (detailing that violations
of IHL committed by PMSCs may be attributable to States if the PMSC was contracted
to “carry out functions normally conducted by organs of the State”); Alon Harel &
Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-To-Be-Met Challenges for Law and
Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 772 (2011) (explaining broadly the concept of
“inherently governmental functions” as those that cannot be permissibly delegated to
private actors).
139. See White, supra note 77, at 137.
140. See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text (describing the type of activities
that PMSCs engage in today).
141. See, e.g., MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that contracting
States are liable for violations of IHL committed by members of organized armed
forces).

2012] PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

727

details activities that constitute direct participation in hostilities,
not those that permissibly should be performed by PMSCs.
2. Implementation
Once defined, the next task is to delineate the mechanics.
The first piece is to determine who should regulate and how
regulation should be encouraged or enforced.
This proposal—like those of the ICRC and the Mercenary
Working Group—recommends government-level regulation.142
One commentator notes that focusing exclusively on
government-level, or “formal,” regulation may not bring realistic
regulatory results, and suggests encouraging regulation by
industry associations.143 This point is well-taken, as the
commentator explains that States often are not willing or able to
effectively regulate PMSCs.144 The concern, however, is not with
the theory of governments regulating PMSCs, but with the
reality of their unwillingness or inability to effectively do so.145
Among the potential regulators (industry, States, and
international organizations), States, as entities that actually
authorize, regulate, and contract PMSCs, remain best-positioned
to regulate them.146 While recognizing that additional levels of
regulation by other actors may enhance the results of formal
regulation, this Article endorses formal State-level regulation as
the single best approach towards providing effective regulation.
To address the concern of State unwillingness or inability to
regulate PMSCs, there must be an incentive or mechanism to
encourage or require State regulation. The two basic
142. See Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8,
Annex art. 12, at 30 (“Each State Party shall develop and adopt national legislation to
adequately and effectively regulate the activities of PMSCs.”); White, supra note 77, at
135 (“The international law obligations identified, and good practices proposed in the
Montreux Document are mainly applicable to states . . . .”). See generally MONTREUX
DOCUMENT, supra note 3.
143. Surabhi Ranganathan, Between Complicity and Irrelevance? Industry Associations
and the Challenge of Regulating Private Security Contractors, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 303, 305–06
(2010).
144. Id. at 305.
145. Indeed, although calling for additional regulation by industry associations,
Surabhi Ranganathan recognizes that States are best-situated to regulate PMSCs. See id.
at 305–06, 309.
146. See White, supra note 77, at 143 (“[E]ffective control and accountability of
PMSCs is dependent on a system of national regulation and enforcement.”).
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possibilities are to either incentivize States to unilaterally
regulate PMSCs or to require them to do so through a binding
treaty. Given the extant problems involving State use of PMSCs
alongside PMSC prevalence in theaters of conflict, it seems
overly optimistic to simply incentivize unilateral State regulation
by highlighting the benefits of more coherent regulation. An
additional problem with unilateral State recognition is that
international humanitarian law aims to regulate the conduct of
all parties to a conflict. If one State unilaterally considers certain
contractors as having combatant status, there is no guarantee
that other States would recognize that status. The better method
is to require government regulation of PMSCs through
international treaty, notwithstanding the difficulties in drafting,
adopting, and ratifying any law of war treaty. Treaties have the
power to bind ratifying States and are of particular importance
in governing the law of war, given the need for equal application
of law among parties to a conflict.147 The current draft treaty
proposed by the Mercenary Working Group would categorically
prohibit contractors from engaging in direct participation.148
This Article’s proposal takes a fundamentally different approach
by recognizing and attempting to regulate the direct
participation of PMSCs in hostilities, rather than seeking to
prohibit it. The PMSC Draft Convention, therefore, is an
unlikely candidate to incorporate this proposal. Nonetheless,
this Article contends that it is more sensible to coherently
regulate the direct participation in hostilities of PMSCs than to
establish a blanket prohibition on direct participation. Whether
through a modification to the Mercenary Working Group’s draft
treaty or a different treaty proposal, it is by way of “hard law” in
the form of an international treaty that governments should be
required to regulate PMSCs.
The treaty provision must distinguish which governments
are to regulate PMSCs. The PMSC Draft Convention
distinguishes among home States (States where the PMSCs are
147. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163,
165 (2011) (“The current system of the laws of war . . . builds on the principle of the
equal application of the law—the uniform and generic treatment of all belligerents on
the battlefield according to the same rules and principles.”).
148. Rep. on the Use of Mercenaries & PMSC Draft Convention, supra note 8,
Annex art. 2(i), at 25.
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registered or incorporated), contracting States (States that
directly contract with PMSCs for their services), States of
operations (in which PMSCs operate), and third States (all other
States).149 The Montreux Document distinguishes similarly
among contracting States, territorial States (States on whose
territory PMSCs operate), home States, and all other States.150
This suggested treaty provision would focus specifically on
contracting States. It is contracting States that actually hire
PMSCs and therefore have the most immediate control and
responsibility over their presence and actions.151 Perhaps for this
reason, the Montreux Document provides the most detailed
regulations for contracting States.152 Additionally, host States are
likely to be experiencing situations of conflict or postconflict
weakness, and home States likely have less incentives to regulate
their own companies. Contracting States, in comparison, decide
to hire PMSCs and pay them for their services. Without
contracting States, PMSCs would not be present in situations of
armed conflict. Contracting States also have a contractual
relationship with PMSCs, which, as discussed below, provides a
clearer nexus for purposes of international humanitarian law
between the private company and the State. Imposing treatylevel obligations on contracting States is therefore the most
direct, and potentially most effective, method to regulate
PMSCs.
The treaty provision would address both international and
noninternational armed conflict. In international armed
conflict, the provision would require governments that employ
PMSCs to engage in “contractor combatant activities” to insert a
contractual provision requiring compliance with Article
4(A)(2). In noninternational armed conflict, the treaty
provision would recognize that hiring PMSCs to perform
contractor combatant activities would be tantamount to
ascribing them a continuous combat function as organized
149. Id. Annex art. 2(j)–(m), at 25.
150. MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 11–14.
151. Cf. Ridlon, supra note 80, at 252 (noting that the United States could be held
liable for the unlawful participation by contractors in hostilities); White, supra note 77,
at 147 (“Given that it is the contracting state that is responsible for the presence of
PMSCs on the territory of another state, it would be incongruous for it not to have due
diligence obligations when both the home and host state do.”).
152. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 11–12.
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armed forces. Under IHL, States employing PMSCs to perform
contractor combatant activities in situations of noninternational
armed conflict would not need to require compliance with
Article 4(A)(2) because Article 4 applies only in situations of
international armed conflict. Nonetheless, it would be
normatively better if the treaty provision affirmatively required
governments employing PMSCs to perform contractor
combatant activities in noninternational conflict to comply with
Article 4(A)(2). As examined in the next Section, the
compliance of PMSCs performing contractor combatant
activities within the meaning of Article 4(A)(2) results in
numerous benefits. These benefits would be realized in any
situation of armed conflict, whether international or
noninternational. Accordingly, although the treaty should at
least require compliance with Article 4(A)(2) in situations of
international armed conflict, additionally requiring compliance
in internal armed conflict would bring benefits during any
conflict sufficient to fall within the province of IHL.
This proposal would be functional, both as a practical
matter and under international humanitarian law. The practical
burdens of mandating compliance with the requirements of
Article 4(A)(2) are not inordinate. Most PMSC personnel
already meet two of the four requirements: they are under
responsible command and they carry arms openly.153 The two
requirements that the majority of personnel arguably do not
meet are those of wearing a distinctive fixed sign and obeying
the laws of war.154 Although many PMSC personnel do not
currently wear a distinctive fixed sign,155 requiring them to do so
153. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2)(a), (c); Gillard, supra
note 78, at 535; Ridlon, supra note 80, at 248–49; Schmitt, supra note 21, at 527–31.
154. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 535 (determining that PMSC personnel wear a
variety of attire making them difficult to identify, and that although there have not
been reports of systemic violations of the laws of war, there have been instances in
which companies have been accused of serious violations); Schmitt, supra note 21, at
527–31 (reaching a similar conclusion to Gillard); cf. Ridlon, supra note 80, at 227,
248–49 (observing that although PMSC fail to distinguish themselves as required by the
Convention, it is difficult to discern whether personnel would comply with the law of
war: “Most of the requirements [of the laws and customs of war] . . . would likely be
met by the PMFs so long as their rules of engagement were not flagrantly illegal and so
long as their personnel act with restraint”).
155. See, e.g., Gillard, supra note 78, at 535 (“[PMSC personnel] wear a variety of
attire, ranging from military uniform-like camouflage gear . . . to civilian attire . . . .”).
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would be simple: if a PMSC took a contract to engage in
contractor combatant activities, the PMSC would need to
provide its personnel with a distinctive uniform. Obeying the
laws of war could be more difficult. Practically, in light of the
current realities of the industry and its employees, there is good
reason to doubt the ability of some PMSC personnel to abide by
the laws of war.156 Nonetheless, as a matter of international
humanitarian law, requiring PMSCs to comply with Article
4(A)(2) would need to be done by contracting governments.157
Contractually mandating law-of-war compliance would increase
the chances that PMSCs abide by the laws of war, which would
be a definite improvement over the state of the industry today.158
Contracting States also could require evidence of past
compliance or current training programs before awarding a bid
to a PMSC.
Contractually mandating compliance with Article 4(A)(2)
would also fulfill the Article’s prefatory requirement that the
“other militia” “belong” to a Party to the conflict.159 There
would be a contractual relationship for the PMSC to perform
combatant activities on behalf of a Party to the conflict (the
government). The contract would also require the PMSC to
abide by the laws of war. This direct contractual relationship
should be sufficient to meet the “belong” requirement.160

156. See generally Dickinson, supra note 114 (providing a fascinating yet unnerving
examination of the organizational structure and institutional culture of PMSCs).
157. See MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 3, at 11 (indicating that contracting
States have an obligation to “ensure that PMSCs that they contract and their personnel
are aware of their [IHL] obligations and trained accordingly”).
158. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 114, at 380 (“[T]he employees of these
companies seem to lack a strong sense of even what the applicable laws and norms are,
let alone have any great commitment to them.”).
159. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2).
160. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 534 (asserting that “a contract to perform
certain services on behalf of a state party to a conflict” easily meets this requirement);
cf. id. (detailing the “belong” requirement as requiring a “de facto relationship”
(quoting INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III, GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 57 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de
Henry trans., 1960)); see also id. (noting that the provision requires, in the words of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, a “relationship of dependence and
allegiance of these irregulars vis-à-vis that party to the conflict” (quoting Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 93–94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999))).
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In sum, treaty provisions should require governments
employing PMSCs to engage in contractor combatant activities
to contractually obligate those companies to fulfill the
requirements of Article 4(A)(2) (definitely for situations of
international armed conflict and ideally also in noninternational armed conflict). Defining contractor combatant
activities and requiring compliance are both feasible. The next
section examines the benefits of recasting the status of some
PMSC personnel as combatant, rather than as presumptively
civilian.
B. Benefits
There are both practical and theoretical benefits to this
approach. The practical benefits are numerous. For one, PMSCs
would be able to comply more easily with the law of armed
conflict: they would know at the commencement of a contract
what kind of duties would constitute combat functions and
could bid for or avoid such contracts accordingly. Moreover, this
approach assuages the issues identified above with relying on
direct participation by providing clarity on the front end.
Because PMSC personnel hired to perform contractor
combatant activities would be wearing distinctive fixed signs, all
sides in the conflict would be able to recognize them as
combatants. It would also be easier for parties in the conflict to
differentiate among contractors hired to be combatants and
contractors hired to be civilians. Additionally, PMSCs receiving
contracts for such assignments would be required to abide by
the law of war. Blackwater, for instance, used illegal exploding
bullets161—as a militia under Article 4(A)(2), it would have been
clearly forbidden from using such ammunition. There would
also be a stronger mechanism to ensure accountability, as the
companies would have a contractual obligation to abide by the
law of war. Even if obstacles remain to prosecuting individuals
directly under the law of war, States would have a breach of

161. See Stop Outsourcing Security Act of 2010, S. 3203, 111th Cong. § 2(18)
(detailing congressional findings).
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contract claim against PMSCs that failed to comply with the laws
of war.162
This proposal also fits theoretically within existing
international humanitarian law. First, by complying with Article
4(A)(2), PMSC personnel would receive the benefits of
combatant status.163 By the same token, they would avoid the
potential for high levels of unprivileged belligerency because
they would have the lawful ability to directly participate in
hostilities. There is also a strong argument that certain PMSCs
would benefit more from the lawful ability to engage in
hostilities than from the protection of civilian status. This
assertion is especially true in situations in which the other side
may lack the incentives or capability to abide by the laws of war
and respect civilian status. Rather than needing legal (civilian)
protection before any attack, PMSCs might prefer legal
(combatant) protection for responding to an attack. A practical
concern may be that granting PMSCs the legal entitlement to
shoot would be unwise, especially in light of such incidents as
the Nisour Square massacre.164 Status as a belligerent, however,
only grants the combatant the right to lawfully engage in
hostilities pursuant to international humanitarian law.165
Consequently, PMSC personnel would be obligated to abide by
IHL in the same way as other parties to the conflict, which,
unsurprisingly, would not allow them to lawfully open fire on a
plaza of civilians.
Second, Article 4(A)(2) deals with groups, not
individuals.166 As a result, PMSCs hired to perform contractor
162. Similarly, the PMSC “Draft Convention generally envisages that such
remedies [for violations of IHL and human rights] will be found in the national
systems of the contracting parties . . . .” White, supra note 77, at 148; see id. at 143
(explaining that because “effective control and accountability of PMSCs” demands
“national regulation . . . . The Draft Convention requires state parties to ‘establish a
comprehensive domestic regime of regulation and oversight over the activities in its
territory of PMSCs’”).
163. See Ridlon, supra note 80, at 250 (observing that Article 4(A)(2) classifies
noncomplying parties as civilians, a classification that brings with it the risk of being
considered illegal combatants under the Conventions).
164. See Johnston & Broder, supra note 2 (describing how Blackwater security
personnel shot and killed seventeen Iraqi civilians at Nisour Square).
165. See, e.g., David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law
of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 999–1000 (2009) (describing “the combatant
privilege”).
166. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 583; Schmitt, supra note 21, at 527.
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combatant activities should be examined at the company level,
not the individual level.167 This distinction would allow for a
categorical approach to determining combatant status at the
moment of employing some PMSCs, rather than requiring a
difficult post hoc determination of direct participation at the
individual level in every single case. Accordingly, for PMSCs
hired to perform contractor combatant activities, there would be
no need to split such hairs over issues such as whether the
contractor was on-duty.168
Third, placing PMSCs under Article 4(A)(2) is consistent
with the IHL framework. Article 4(A)(2) broadly covers
“militias,” which does not include government employees.169 It is
an intuitively logical classification of an organized group hired
to participate directly in hostilities on the behalf of a party to the
conflict, when that group does not fit the definition of a
mercenary. Although one commentator highlights the historical
purpose of Article 4(A)(2) as being at odds with placing PMSCs
within it, the same commentator recognizes that “there is no
obligation to restrict the interpretation of Article 4(A)(2) to its
historical purpose.”170 Indeed, given the limited number of
treaties regulating armed conflict, it makes more sense to read
Article 4(A)(2) functionally, rather than historically, in order to
regulate a new presence in the theater of armed conflict.
Finally, such an approach would not eliminate the method
espoused in the Montreux Document. Many contractors would
still be considered civilians and would still fall under the direct
participation determination. This approach seeks instead to
modify the ICRC’s position by placing a category of PMSCs—
those hired to perform contractor combatant activities—
presumptively onto the combatant side.
The strongest potential disadvantages to this approach are
practical. States may be unable or unwilling to regulate PMSCs.
Private military and security companies also are often politically
powerful and many operate multinationally, rendering effective
167. See Gillard, supra note 78, at 535 (examining the Article 4(A)(2)
requirements as they would apply to companies).
168. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
169. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 31, art. 4(A)(2); Schmitt, supra note
21, at 527.
170. See Cameron, supra note 78, at 586.

2012] PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

735

State-level regulation difficult.171 A treaty provision may be
difficult to draft, adopt, and ratify. Nonetheless, any suggested
regulation of PMSCs will encounter similar practical difficulties.
Additionally, this proposal chooses to regulate the existence of
PMSCs in situations of armed conflict (an approach consistent
with the Montreux Document, which has garnered significant
governmental approval),172 rather than to prohibit broadly the
scope of their participation (the position the Mercenary
Working Group espouses in the PMSC Draft Convention). It is
therefore more likely to achieve governmental acceptance and
recognition, especially by countries in which the PMSC industry
already is established.173 This proposal aims not to solve all the
problems resulting from the prevalence of PMSCs in situations
of armed conflict, but rather to suggest a more nuanced and
coherent form of regulating them under international
humanitarian law.
CONCLUSION
Private military and security companies strain the
combatant-civilian dichotomy under international humanitarian
law. In light of the ambiguity over their status, the general
consensus is that the great majority of PMSC personnel should
be presumed civilians. Consequently, they receive protection
unless and until they “directly participate” in hostilities. Yet
there are serious deficiencies with this categorization:
contractors regularly engage in activities that amount to direct
participation, direct participation provides an ephemeral line in
a field where clear boundaries are necessary, and direct
participation by civilian contractors in hostilities constitutes
unprivileged belligerency.
171. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Hurst, Note, “Trade in Force”: The Need for Effective
Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 447, 450–51
(2011).
172. Thirty-eight States currently support the Montreux Document. See
Participating States of the Montreux Document, SWISS FED. DEP'T FOREIGN AFF.,
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html (last
updated Dec. 6, 2011).
173. See White, supra note 77, at 139 (noting that trying to prohibit the
outsourcing of security services may be futile because “it may be that the horse has
bolted in some countries, especially . . . the US and the UK, where the PMSC industry is
well-developed and influential”).
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Accordingly, a more practical and analytically satisfactory
approach is to craft a list of “contractor combatant activities”
that constitute direct participation in hostilities. If contracting
States hired PMSCs to engage in contractor combatant activities,
a proposed treaty provision would presume the PMSC personnel
to be combatants and contracting States would be required to
ensure that such contractors abided by the requirements of
Article 4(A)(2). The treaty provision would require compliance
in international armed conflict and, ideally, in noninternational
armed conflict as well. This approach provides a workable line
by which to more cleanly sever PMSC activities along the
principle of distinction, and to allow for more effective
regulation of their inevitable presence on and around the
battlefield.

